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Abstract
This paper studies secessions as the outcome of conﬂict between
regions. We study under what conditions regions will divert costly re-
sources to ﬁght each other over political borders. We derive the prob-
ability of secession and the amount of resources diverted to separatist
conﬂict, and show how those variables depend on factors such as het-
erogeneity costs, economies of scale, relative size, and external threats.
We also model civil conﬂict over types of government, after borders
have been determined, and study how this political conﬂict aﬀects the
incentives to secede.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D74, H10, H56, H77.
Keywords: Secessions, Conﬂict Technology, Heterogeneity Costs,
Economies of Scale, External Threats.
1 Introduction
Since 1990 over twenty new sovereign states have been created through se-
cessions and break up of countries.1 Today there are 193 internationally
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1The Soviet Union split into Russia and 14 more sovereign states; Yugoslavia gave way
to Serbia and ﬁve additional states, plus Kosovo; Czechoslovakia broke into two separate
1recognized sovereign states in the world, up from 74 in 1945.2 According to
Gurr’s (2000) Minorities at Risk dataset, between 1985 and 1999 secession-
ist movements were present in at least 52 countries. This dramatic increase
in the number of countries and the spreading of separatism have motivated
a growing literature on the formation and redrawing of political borders.
Students of this important issue include not only historians and political sci-
entists but also, more recently, economists.3 The new economics literature
on the number and size of nations has provided formal models in which the
borders of states are not taken as exogenous, but are the outcomes of de-
c i s i o n sb ya g e n t sw h oi n t e r a c tw i t he a ch other while pursuing their goals
under constraints. Recent contributors to this literature include Alesina and
Spolaore (1997, 2003, 2005, 2006), Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg. (2000,
2005), Bolton and Roland (1997), Bordignon and Brusco (2001), Ellingsen
(1998), Findlay (1996), Goyal and Staal (2004), LeBreton and Weber (2003),
Spolaore (2004, 2006), and Wittman (2000) among others.4
While this literature has provided numerous insights on the incentives to
secede and form new countries, less attention has been given to the analysis
of secessions as the outcome of civil conﬂict, in which resources are diverted
in order to ﬁght over borders.5 However, attempts to secession often entail
the threat or actual use of force, the mobilization of vast resources, and huge
human and material costs.6 Historically, civil conﬂict has often produced
more victims and damage than interstate wars. The American Civil War
which followed the secession of eleven Southern states was America’s blood-
iest conﬂict, with over 600,000 deaths. Violent conﬂicts within national
states; Eritrea seceeded from Ethiopia; Namibia gained independence from South Africa;
and Timor Leste left Indonesia.
2193 is the sum of the 192 members of the United Nations, as of January 2007, plus
the Vatican, which is an independent state but not a UN member.
3Inﬂuential contributions from a political and historical perspective are Anderson
(1983), Gellner (1983), Tilly (1990), and many others. A classic reference on ethnic
conﬂict is Horowitz (1985).
4For recent analyses by political scientists on this topic see, for instance, Hiscox (2003)
and Lake and O’Mahony (2004).
5More attention has been given to the eﬀects of international conﬂict on the incentives
to form political unions (for example, see Alesina and Spolaore, 2005a, 2005b). Unlike
those contributions, this paper is not focused on international conﬂict after borders have
been formed, but on civil conﬂict about borders themselves.
6Even when no violence takes place, changes in existing borders happen under the
"shadow of power," and are aﬀected by the relative strengths of the groups who beneﬁt
or lose from those changes.
2borders have been widespread in recent decades.7 A c c o r d i n gt oF e a r o na n d
Laitin (2003), between 1945 and 1999 "there were roughly 127 civil wars
that killed at least 1000, 25 of which were ongoing in 1999. A conservative
estimate of the total dead as a direct result of these conﬂicts is 16.2 million,
ﬁve time the interstate toll."
This paper’s goal is to provide a simple analytical framework in which
secessions are the equilibrium outcome of explicit civil conﬂict, where groups
with diﬀerent preferences invest in costly conﬂict activities in order to aﬀect
the conﬁguration of borders. We will also consider civil conﬂict over domes-
tic policy after political borders have been formed, and will study how such
conﬂict over domestic policy may aﬀect the incentives to ﬁght over borders.
Our analysis is linked to the expanding literature on the eﬀects of conﬂict and
appropriation on economic and political outcomes, which includes contribu-
tions by Haavelmo (1954), Hirshleifer (1989, 1991, 1995), Garﬁnkel (1990),
Grossman (1991, 1994), Grossman and Kim (1995), Gershenson and Gross-
man (2000), Powell (1999), Skaperdas (1992), and many others.8
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic frame-
work (a two-region model). Subsection 2.1 derives the incentives to secede
and form separate countries in the absence of civil conﬂict, while Subsection
2.2 presents the technology of conﬂict. Section 3 derives the total spending
on conﬂict output in the two regions, and the endogenous probability of se-
cession. Those variables and the extent of separatist conﬂict are a function of
the incentives to secede and of the incentives to oppose a secession. We show
how those incentives depend on heterogeneity costs associated with diﬀerent
preferences over the type of government, economies of scale in the provision
of public goods, and the relative size of the two regions. A special case of
economies of scale from a larger size stems from the provision of defense and
security against external threats. An analytical illustration of the eﬀects of
external threats on secessions is given in Section 4. Interestingly, external
threats do not necessarily reduce the intensity of separatist conﬂict because
they increase the larger region’s incentives to resist the smaller region’s se-
cession, and may therefore lead to more diversion of resources towards civil
conﬂict. Section 5 extends the analysis to civil conﬂict over the type of gov-
ernment after borders have been determined. In equilibrium, conﬂict over
7Of course, not all civil conﬂicts are about secessions. In this paper we will also consider
civil conﬂict about "the type of government," and study how it may aﬀect the incentives
to break up.
8For a recent survey see Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2006).
3the type of government reduces the heterogeneity costs and hence the incen-
tives to secede in the smaller region, while it also reduces the beneﬁts from
a political union in the larger region. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Set Up
Consider two regions. Region 1 has a population equal to S, while Region 2
has a population equal to P − S.L e tσ denote the relative size of Region 2





Without loss of generality, we will assume that Region 1 is the larger region
(σ<1). We will call "union" the status quo,i nw h i c ht h et w or e g i o n sf o r mo n e
uniﬁed country with population P. When the two regions are uniﬁed, they
share one public good (the "government"). The total cost of the government






"Separation" (or "secession") is the state of the world in which a breakup
has occurred. Under separation, each region is independent and pays for its
own government. Again, we assume that under separation the total cost of
government in each independent country is K.9 Therefore, under separation
people in Region 1 pay a cost per capita equal to
K
S
, while people in Region
2p a yac o s tp e rc a p i t ae q u a lt o
K
P − S
. Consequently, being part of a larger
c o u n t r yb r i n g sa b o u te c o n o m i e so fs c a l ei nt h ep r o v i s i o no ft h ep u b l i cg o o d
(the government), since its costs can be spread over a larger number of citi-
zens. The higher is the cost of the public good, the higher are the economies
of scale..Speciﬁcally, for Region 1 the economies of scale can be expressed in
9The assumption could be relaxed to allow for a variable cost of government, so that
the aggregate cost of government would be higher in larger countries. What matters for
our results is that the costs per capita should be decreasing in the size of the country. For
example, total government costs in a country of size S may be equal to a ﬁxed cost K plus
a variable cost linear in S - with per capita costs being then equal to K/S plus a constant.


















For each region the beneﬁts from scale are positive and increasing in the
relative size of the other region. If those economies of scale were the only
factor at play, the status quo (union) would dominate separation for both
regions. However, being part of a larger country may come with costs as well
as beneﬁts. In particular, we will focus on an important set of costs that have
received special attention in the economic literature on the size of countries:
"heterogeneity costs." These are deﬁned as the costs associated with the need
to provide a common public good ( i.e., the same government) to populations
with diverse preferences over types of government. Diﬀerences in preferences
may stem from diverse ethnic and cultural characteristics (religion, language,
etc.) and/or other political and ideological diﬀerences. In our highly stylized
model, we will assume that there are only two types of government: type
1 and type 2. All citizens of Region 1 prefer type 1 to type 2, while all
citizens of Region 2 prefer type 2 to type 1. We assume that each citizen
obtains maximum utility from government services when the government of
her country is of her preferred type, and lower utility when the government
is of the other type. We normalize each citizen’s maximum utility from
government services to zero, and assume that each citizen’s utility is reduced
by −h when the government is of the other type. That is, a citizen of Region
2 who lives in a country with government of type 1 obtains utility from
government services equal to −h,w h i l ei ft h eg o v e r n m e n ti so ft y p e1 ,h e r
utility from government services is equal to 0.10
10An interesting issue is whether average heterogeneity costs in a country depend on
population size. In our simple setting we assume that each population within a region is
perfectly homogenoeus - that is, individuals within each region share identical preferences
about the type of government. Hence, average heterogeneity costs are a function of the
number of regions that compose a country. Speciﬁcally, heterogeneity costs are zero when
a country is composed of only one region, and positive when a country is formed by two
regions. A positive relationship between heterogeneity costs and country size will hold
insofar as a larger country size is obtained by expanding the number of regions: larger
countries, by including more regions, have higher heterogenity costs. In contrast, an
5We assume that all citizens have a ﬁxed endowment equal to y,w h i c ht h e y
can use for consumption, and to pay for their share of the public good.11 Fi-
nally, for each agent i we assume that total utility Ui is linear in consumption
ci and utility from government services gi :
Ui = ci + gi (5)
where gi is either 0 or −h.
2.1 Costs and Beneﬁts of Union and Separation in the
Absence of Civil Conﬂict
Before we introduce civil conﬂict, it is useful to consider the case in which
there is no conﬂict by assumption (no "technology of conﬂict" is available).
Suppose that the type of government is chosen democratically by majority
vote.12 Since Region 1 is the larger region, type 1 will be selected by a
majority of citizens. We also assume that taxes are set equally across all
citizens.13 Consumption will be given by disposable income, which is equal
increase in country size due to an expansion in each region’s population, without a change
in the number of regions, would not increase heterogenity costs, as long as the additional
citizens in each region have the same preferences (that is, as long as each region remains
homogeneous). These assumptions are consistent with the approach to heterogeneity costs
discussed in Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003) and Spolaore (2006).
11As we will see, the endowment can also be used by each agent to contribute to the
resources diverted to civil conﬂict with the other region over political issues (borders and
the type of government). For most of our analysis we will assume that the endowment y
is safe, and appropriative activities are taken only in order to aﬀect political outcomes.
We will relax this assumption at the end of the paper, when we study external threats.
For simplicity, we also assume that the endowment is independent of the choices over
conﬂict, borders etc. This assumption could be relaxed to allow for production and trade,
an extension which we do not pursue in this paper.
12The analysis here is close to Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Goyal and Staal (2004), and
Spolaore (2006).
13That is, we assume that it is not posssible to set diﬀerent taxes in the two regions,
but that all citizens contribute equally to the public good. Since we assume identical
income per capita, this is a reasonable benchmark assumption. A diﬀerent outcome would
occur if the inhabitants of region 1 could impose higher taxes on the inhabitants of region 2
(regional redistribution). We abstract from this possibility. We also rule out the possibility
of transfers (side payments) from Region 1 to Region 2 in order to keep Region 2 in the
union when secessions are possible. On these issues see LeBreton and Weber (2003) and
Alesina and Spolaore (2003, chapter 4).
6to the endowment y minus the per-capita cost of the public good. Each
citizen of Region 1 obtains the following utility from a political union of size
P




Utility for each individual in Region 2 is given by




When the two regions form independent countries, all citizens of Region 1
will select a government of type 1, while all citizens of Region 2 will select
type 2. Therefore, utility from separation in Region 1 is




while utility from separation in Region 2 is




Clearly, all individuals in Region 1 strictly prefer union to separation. They
are the median voter in the uniﬁed country, where they can enjoy their pre-
ferred type of government while spreading the costs over a larger population.
Let ∆1 denote region 1’s beneﬁts per capita from union over separation. They
are






= kσ > 0 (10)
By contrast, the citizens of Region 2 face a trade-oﬀ.I nt h eu n i ﬁed country
they pay less for the government because of economies of scale (equal to
k
σ
in per-capita terms), but get less utility out of it because of heterogeneity
costs, which are measured by h in per-capita terms. Let ∆2 denote Region
2’s per-capita beneﬁts (costs, if negative) from separation over union














, people in Region 2 prefer to be part of a uniﬁed country and




there is no potential for conﬂict over borders between regions.
Union is unanimously preferred over secession by all citizens. Of course,
citizens in the uniﬁed country still diﬀe ro v e rt h et y p eo fg o v e r n m e n t .T h e
inhabitants of Region 2 prefer type 2 to type 1, but accept to stay in a
uniﬁed country with a type-1 government because the economies of scale




, separation is preferred to union by Region 2’s citizens
because the heterogeneity costs they face are higher than the economies of
scale. This is the most interesting case, as it implies conﬂicting preferences
over the conﬁguration of borders. The citizens of Region 1 prefer to keep a
union, while the citizens of Region 2 prefer secession. This is the case that
we will study in the rest of the paper, where borders are decided through an
explicit conﬂict technology, which we are going to introduce in the following
subsection.14
2.2 The Technology of Conﬂict
At the heart of this paper is a model of explicit conﬂict over borders. In
the rest of our analysis we are going to assume that borders are not decided
peacefully (say, through majority vote or other "nonconﬂictual" mechanism),
but are determined by a contest between the two regions.15 Consistently with
the economic literature on conﬂict, we assume that the probability of winning
the contest depends on the amount of resources that each region diverts
towards "separatist conﬂict." We will denote those levels of "conﬂict inputs"
by F1 and F2 (for "eFfort" or "Force"). The winner of the contest will be able
14In other terms, h>
k
σ
(Region 2’s obtaining positive beneﬁts from secession) is a
necessary condition for conﬂict, which we will deﬁne as a positive diversion of resources
into conﬂict activities. In general, whether conﬂict actually takes place in equilibrium
depends on the costs of conﬂict, on the technology of conﬂict, and on the extensive form
of the game.
15We will assume that each Region can act as a uniﬁed agent, overcoming any collective—
action problem among its citizens. An interesting extension would be to consider free riding
within each region, and the provision of selective incentives to individuals in order for them
to contribute to separatist and anti-separatist activities. Free riding and collective-action
issues may open additional channels through which the relative size of the two regions
may play a role in equilibrium.
8to decide the conﬁguration of borders - that is, whether the country should
remain uniﬁed or there should be two separate countries (secession). Given
our assumption that h>
k
σ
,w eh a v et h a ti fR e g i o n1w i n st h ec o n t e s t ,t h e r e
will be one country, while if Region 2 wins there will be two countries. We
denote with π the probability that Region 2 wins (probability of secession),
while 1−π is the probability that the country will remain uniﬁed. In general,
the probability of secession is increasing in Region 2’s force F2 and decreasing
in Region 1’s force F1







> 0. A In order to simplify the analysis and obtain
tractable closed-form solutions, we assume the following speciﬁcation, which










where Φ(.) is a non-negative and increasing function.17 In particular, our
technology of conﬂict is a special case of a "ratio" contest success function




Formally, a general ratio contest success function is obtained for Φ(F)=
Fm, m>0.An alternative speciﬁcation, which has also been used in the
economic literature, is the "logistic" or "diﬀerence" function, characterized
by Φ(F)=e x p ( βF), where Region 2’s probability of success is a function of
the diﬀerence F2 − F1 (see Hirshleifer, 1989).
16If F1 = F2 =0we have π =1 /2. Alternative assumptions for this case would not
change our results.
17See Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2006) and the references they cite for a discussion of
alternative speciﬁcations. The function could be generalized to allow for asymmetry.




with ψ>1. We abstract from those asymmetries in our analysis.
18See Tullock (1980).
9Alternative formalizations of the contest success function have diﬀerent
analytical implications, especially at the "corners" in which one side makes
no eﬀo r tw h i l et h eo t h e rc h o o s e sap o s i t i v ee ﬀort. Clearly, the ratio function
implies that the side making no eﬀort must face a zero probability of success
so long as the other side commits any ﬁnite amount of resources to the
ﬁght. By contrast, the logistic speciﬁcation implies that a side could face a
positive probability of winning even when investing no resources in conﬂict.19
Therefore, the ratio function can be viewed as more appropriate to study
situations in which both parties must actively engage in conﬂict in order to
gain any "prize," while the logistic function can capture cases in which a
side that makes no eﬀort would not "lose everything" (Hirshleifer, 1989). In
our framework winning the contest for Region 2 means having a successful
secession, while "not winning" would not mean "losing everything" (say,
losing all one’s income, land etc.), but just keeping the status quo (a political
union with Region 1). It seems then reasonable to assume that a secession,
when opposed by the other region, can occur only through active separatist
eﬀorts. In this respect, a ratio function appears to be more realistic than a
logistic function.20
19Consequently, as pointed out by Hirshleifer (1989), when the two agents choose their
levels of eﬀorts noncooperatively and simultaneously in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the
logistic technology is consistent with corner solutions (F1 =0and/or F2 =0 ) while the
ratio technology always implies positive equilibrium levels (F1 > 0 and F2 > 0). In order to
obtain corner solutions with a ratio contest function, one might consider non-simultaneous
games with a more complex extensive form . For example, Region 1 could invest in force
at an earlier stage in order to deter Region 2 from investing in secessionist activities at a
later stage ("submission"). We do not pursue those dynamic extensions in this paper.
20An interesting extension of our analysis would be to model the separatist conﬂict as
regarding (a) the military control of Region 2’s territory (de facto separation), and (b)
"forcing" Region 1’s formal recognition of Region 2’s independence (de jure separation).
If the inhabitants of Region 2 enjoy asymmetric advantages due to geography, better
knowledge of the territory etc., they might achieve and maintain control over part of
their territory even in the absence of explicit investment in conﬂict activities, consistently
with a logistic speciﬁcation. However, it seems implausible that a seceding government
could obtain de jure sovereignty and recognition from the other region without a positive
commitment of resources. A formalization of conﬂict over de facto control as well as
conﬂict over de jure sovereignty might then include both "logistic" and "ratio" contests.
We can interpret the simple ratio speciﬁcation of this paper as a "reduced form," in
which "winning" entails complete (de facto and de jure) control over Region 2. Another
extension/re-interpretation, which we do not pursue here, would be to include lobbying
and other "persuasion" activities in our analysis of separatist conﬂict. Some of those
activities may target the citizens of Region 1 (to "persuade" them to let Region 2 go),
103 Separatist Conﬂict
We are now ready to consider the choices of the two regions regarding sep-
aratist conﬂict.21 Speciﬁcally, F1 will be chosen to maximize the expected
utility of each citizen in Region 1, which is22













and the ﬁrst-order condition for maximization of the above expected utility,
for given F2,i s
F2∆1
(F∗




w h e r et h el e f t - h a n ds i d ei st h em a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁt from an extra unit of force
and the right-hand side is the marginal cost per capita. Hence, Region 1’s
best-response function to Region 2’s level of force is
BR1(F2)=
p
∆1SF2 − F2 (17)
Analogously, Region 2’s expected utility is














and the citizens of Region 2 (to "persuade" them to stay), while other activities may target
external agents (foreign powers, international organizations), which we do not model in
this paper. See Skaperdas and Vaidya (2005) for a discussion of "persuasion as a contest."
21We will focus on simultaneous Cournot games, and use a standard Cournot-Nash
equilibrium solution. An interesting topic for further research is the study of more complex
dynamic games, in which a region may inﬂuence future decisions of the other region by
precommitting to a given level of eﬀort. For example, Region 1 may be able to choose a very
high level of eﬀort and therefore induce the other region not to invest in conﬂict (unilateral
"submission"). For an interesting analysis of a dynamic civil war (over resources, not
over secessions and borders) see Gershenson and Grossman (2000). As we have already
mentioned, "corner" solutions in which one or both sides invest nothing in conﬂict are
possible as Cournot-Nash equilibria of simultaneous games when the technology of conﬂict
is logistic (Hirshleifer, 1989).
22In this analysis we will abstract from a further cost of conﬂict: the direct destruction
of human lives and properties (the "havoc of war"). Depending on the speciﬁcation of
the extensive form and on the values of the parameters, direct costs from destruction
might induce one or both regions not to ﬁght in equilibrium. In the case of ﬁght, direct
destruction obviously increases the welfare losses from conﬂict.







Consequently, Region 2’s best-response function is
BR2(F1)=
p
∆2(P − S)F1 − F1 (20)



























(∆1 + σ∆2)2 =
(σk)2(σh− k)








(∆1 + σ∆2)2 =
k(σh− k)2
[σh− (1 − σ)k]2 (23)

















The economic interpretation of the above expression is as follows:
(1) the probability of separation is higher when Region 2 faces high incen-
tives to secede because of high heterogeneity costs (high h) and low economies
of scale (low k). As we have seen, the term h −
k
σ
,w h i c hi sp o s i t i v eb ya s -
sumption, captures the beneﬁts to Region 2 of separating (gross of conﬂict
costs). The probability of secession is increasing in those beneﬁts.;
(2) high economies of scale (high k) reduce the probability of separa-
tion not only be dampening Region 2’s incentives to break up, but also by
increasing Region 1’s incentives to ﬁght against the secession.
12(3) ﬁnally, secessions are more likely for higher σ0s - that is, when the
seceding region is relatively large.
Results (1) and (2) are quite intuitive. Result (3) is less obvious. A
higher σ increases Region 2’s net beneﬁts from a secession (a larger Region
2c a nﬁnance its own public good more cheaply). However, a larger σ also
means higher beneﬁts from a union for Region 1, because a larger Region 2 is
associated with larger economies of scale for Region 1 when the two regions
form a uniﬁed country. Hence, a higher σ strengthens both the incentives
to secede in Region 2 and to resist secession in Region 1, with potentially
ambiguous results. However, a higher σ a l s om e a n st h a t" f o r c ep e rc a p i t a "
is relatively cheaper in Region 2 and relatively more expensive in Region 1.
This additional eﬀect unambiguously increases the probability of secession.
It turns out that the eﬀects on the relative cost of force per capita in the two
regions, when added to the eﬀects of a higher σ on Region 2’s incentives to
secede, are suﬃcient to oﬀset the eﬀects of a larger σ on Region 1’s incentives
to ﬁght the secession,. Therefore, on net, a higher σ is associated with a
higher probability of secession.23
Since people devote valuable resources to unproductive conﬂict inputs,
the equilibrium outcome is Pareto ineﬃcient: all agents would be strictly
better oﬀ if they could jointly commit to a diﬀerent allocation of resources,
in which each region i chooses a level of force equal to a fraction λ of its
equilibrium level, with λ<1.24 Then the probability of secession would
n o tb ea ﬀected, but each agent would have higher consumption. However,
this solution is not an equilibrium (the best response to F
0
1 is not F
0
2 but a
level of force higher than F∗
2). T h i si st h es t a n d a r di n e ﬃciency associated
with a ratio contest success function - that is, with conﬂict and rent-seeking
activities in which each agent’s payoﬀ is a function of the agent’s relative
eﬀort, and everybody could be better oﬀ i fa l lw e r et or e d u c et h e i re ﬀort
proportionally.
However, an equilibrium outcome with a positive level of "separatist con-
ﬂict" does not necessarily provide lower average welfare than a "peaceful"
23This is consistent with the intuitive view that, historically, the increase in the relative
population of the colonies with respect to the colonizing powers reduced the colonizers’
incentives to oppose decolonization. See Grossman and Iyigun (1997).







13equilibrium in which borders are determined by majority vote, and hence
union prevails. While a separatist conﬂict is socially wasteful, it might rep-
resent a "second best" if it brings about the breakup of an ineﬃcient union.
Speciﬁc a l l y ,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a ti nt h ec o n ﬂict equilibrium aggregate ex-
pected utility is higher than in the "peaceful" equilibrium studied in Section







The above condition shows that conﬂict is "welfare-improving" over a







, which is decreasing in σ (conﬂict is more likely to be
"welfare-improving" when the secessionist region is larger). The critical value
2+σ
σ
is higher than the critical value
1+σ
σ
above which secessions without
conﬂict are socially preferable to unions.26
A good measure of the extent to which resources are diverted to socially
wasteful uses is aggregate spending in conﬂict activities F1 + F2. In equilib-




















= σ(1 − σ)kπ
∗ (26)
This measure can be interpreted as the extent of separatist conﬂict in this
society. Ceteris paribus, higher heterogeneity costs (a higher h) are associate
with higher separatist conﬂict. This is intuitive, since higher heterogeneity
costs, for given economies of scale, increase the incentives to secede in Region
2. On the other hand, the eﬀect of higher economies of scale on aggregate
separatist conﬂict is ambiguous. The equation above implies that an increase
25The details of the derivation are available upon request.









for which an "ineﬃcient
union" without conﬂict is socially preferable to the conﬂict equilibrium.






that is, if and only if the elasticity of the probability of separation with
respect to the economies of scale is larger than one28:





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ > 1
In other words, an increase in k reduces separatist conﬂict only when it
has a big dampening eﬀect on the relative force of Region 2 compared to
the force of Region 1. This result is an example of a more general point:
factors that reduce the probability of separation may increase the extent
of separatist conﬂict. The probability of separation is determined not only
by the incentives to secede faced by the separatist region, but also by the
incentives to resist separation faced by the larger region. Economies of scale
reduce the incentives to secede but also strengthens the incentives to repress
separatism. If the eﬀects on anti-separatist activities is high enough, an
increase in economies of scale might be associated with higher aggregate
resources devoted to separatist conﬂict, while the probability of separatism
is lower.
4E x t e r n a l T h r e a t s
An interesting application of our analysis arises in relation to the eﬀects of
external threats on the cohesion of countries and political unions. In general,
27Of course, this is under the assumption that, after the incresae in k, Region 2 still
wants to secede. If the increase were to be so large as to reverse the inequality h>
k
σ
and turn it into h<
k
σ
,a l ls e p a r a t i s tc o n ﬂict would stop, since both regions would prefer
union to separation.










that is, the incentives to secede cannot be too large.
15security and national defense are public goods with large economies of scale.
External threats increase the incentives to form larger political unions for
protection, and hence tend to reduce the probability of separatism. Should
one then infer that secessionist conﬂicts would be reduced when the country
is faced with external threats? Should we expect to observe a reduction in
the extent of civil conﬂict over borders when a country faces threats from
outside?29 Not necessarily. In fact, it is possible that, when faced with the
perspective of future external threats, and hence a stronger incentive to ﬁght
separatist tendencies, the anti-separatist region will increase the resources it
spends on ﬁghting secession. In principle, this increase may be larger than the
r e d u c t i o ni nc o n ﬂict activities by the separatist region. Hence, whether an
external threat will reduce the level of resources diverted to separatist conﬂict
will depend on the value of the parameters: only a very large eﬀect of the
threat on the probability of separatism will be associated with a reduction
in the extent of separatist conﬂict.
A simple illustration of this principle can be provided by an extension of
our basic model to include external threats. We will sketch the extension
below, and leave the details of the analysis to the reader. We can model an
external threat as the existence of a predatory "enemy" with exogenous power




a country of size Z (in our set up, Z can take values P, S,a n dP −S), where
M denotes the level of military defense of the country.3031 After borders
have been set, the government of the country chooses the level of M that
maximizes income per capita net of defense costs, which we will denote by
x32
29For recent analyses of the relationship between conﬂict within groups and conﬂict
across groups in a diﬀerent context (appropriative conﬂict over resources) see Garﬁnkel
(2004a, 2004b, 2004c) and Münster and Staal (2005). The relationship between endoge-
nous group formation and out-group hostility is studied by Lester (2005) within a model
of trust and trade.
30For simplicity we assume that the power of the enemy is the same for all countries.
The model could be extended to allow for the endogenous determination of the enemy’s
resources diverted to attack each country. For general-equilibrium models of country
formation and breakup with endogenous external threats see Alesina and Spolaore (2005,
2006). In those analyses, however, there is no civil conﬂict over borders.
31We also abstract from the possibility that the two regions, if separate, may engage in
an interstate war between themselves.












EyZ − E (28)
and net income per capita in equilibrium is given by
x








Note that net income x is increasing in country size Z. In other words, exter-
nal threats introduce an additional source of economies of scale - speciﬁcally,
net beneﬁts from a larger size associated with the cheaper provision of se-
curity. A bigger threat (a larger E) leads to higher beneﬁts from size - an
eﬀe c tt h a ti sq u a l i t a t i v e l ys i m i l a rt oal a r g e rk. Hence, mutatis mutandis,t h e
above analysis can be extended to the case of external threats. The details
of the analysis are left to the reader.
In the following Section we will abstract from external threats, but pursue
a separate extension: What are the implications for conﬂict over borders
when the citizens of the two regions can also ﬁght over the type of government
after borders have been determined?
5C o n ﬂict over the Type of Government and
Incentives to Secede
S of a rw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tc i v i lc o n ﬂict takes place before borders are set,
in order to determined whether there should be one country or two. But
we have also assumed that there is no civil conﬂi c ta f t e rb o r d e r sh a v eb e e n
set.33 After conﬂict over borders is resolved, decisions over governments are
been all used and cannot be employed for national defense after borders have been set.
The model could be extended to allow for some "economies of scope" between regional
force used in civil conﬂict and national force used against external threats. This extension
would create an additional mechanism through which external threats may increase civil
conﬂict.
33We have allowed conﬂict with external enemies in the extension sketched at the end
of teh previous section, but no civil conﬂict within a uniﬁed country.
17taken democratically, without direct or indirect use of resources as "con-
ﬂict inputs.". In particular, we have assumed that, when a union is formed,
the citizens of the larger region (Region 1) can impose their preferred type
of government to the citizens of the smaller region (Region 2). Hence, the
citizens of Region 2 can obtain their preferred type of government only by
forming an independent country. This is a useful benchmark hypothesis to
study secessions, but it abstracts from the possibility that the citizens of
Region 2 may inﬂuence domestic-policy decisions even when the country is
uniﬁed. In this Section we will extend the analysis to consider the case in
which the determination of the type of government in a union is not exclu-
sively in the hands of the majority (Region 1), but is itself the outcome of a
conﬂict between Region 1 and Region 2 after borders have been determined.
In other words, we will investigate the case in which Region 1 and Region
2 can use "domestic conﬂict activities" to aﬀect political decisions. We will
assume that, as in the case of conﬂict over borders, conﬂict over government
policies requires the use of costly resources.34 In particular, let D1 and D2
denote the levels of "domestic conﬂict inputs" that Region 1 and Region 2
use, respectively, in order to aﬀect the decision over the type of government
in the uniﬁed country. In analogy with our formalization above, assume that
the uniﬁed country will have the type of government preferred by the citizens





and the type preferred in Region 2 with probability 1 − ρ.
Region 1 will choose D1 -f o rg i v e nD2 - in order to maximize




34For conceptual reasons - in order to isolate the eﬀects of the diﬀerent kinds of conﬂict -
we will assume that the "conﬂict inputs" mobilized and used to aﬀect borders are diﬀerent
from those used to aﬀect domestic policy. This is a reasonable assumption, insofar as the
timing of the two conﬂicts is distinct, and the mechanisms through which decisions and
policies are aﬀected are diﬀerent. However, in practice, some "conﬂict inputs" could be
used towards both goals. For example, a secessionist movement could use its strenght to
aﬀect a break up and, if unsuccessful, could use those same resources to aﬀect domestic
policy within the union. These "economies of scope" in conﬂict activities would give larger
incentives to invest in those activities.
35Again, if D1 = D2 =0we have ρ =1 /2.
18while Region 2 will choose D2 - for given D1 -i no r d e rt om a x i m i z e










Region 1 will be more likely to impose its will to Region 2 the smaller Region
2 is relative to Region 1. The equilibrium levels of domestic power per capita










(1 + σ)2 (34)
Region 1’s expected utility under a union is higher than utility from separa-
tion if and only if
EU
∗
























ical value is increasing in σ(the larger is Region 2 relative to Region 1, the
more appealing is uniﬁcation for Region 1). It is worth noting that, with
domestic conﬂict over the type of government, Region 1 will now bear parts
of the heterogeneity costs associated with having citizens with diverse pref-
erences, and will take that into account when deciding whether it is worth
ﬁghting over borders.
Conversely, Region 2’s expected utility within a union is higher than
utility from separation if and only if
























below which union is preferred is decreasing in σ (a larger
Region 2 faces smaller incentives to be part of a union). Civil conﬂict over the
type of government aﬀects the two regions’ incentives to form a union or two
separate countries. Overall, conﬂict over the type of government, by bringing
the government closer (in expected value) to Region 2’s preferences , makes
a union more attractive to Region 2, even though more resources will have to









for which Region 2 prefers separation when the type of government
is chosen by majority vote, but union when the type of government is chosen
through conﬂict. On the other hand, Region 1 will ﬁnd a union less attractive
than in the absence of civil conﬂict over the type of government. This is due
to two reasons: the government will be a bit farther (in expected value) from
its preferred type, and consumption will be lower because of the need to
divert resources towards civil conﬂict over the government. In fact, there
exists a range of parameters for which Region 1 now prefers a secession while













In this case, civil conﬂict over governments brings about a "reversal" of civil
conﬂict over borders: the larger region prefers a breakup, while the smaller
region prefers a union. From Region 1’s perspective, civil conﬂict gives so
much power to the smaller region that a union becomes unattractive.





















36This is consistent with empirical results showing that conﬂict is higher in countries
206C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has established a link between the literature on the formation
and breakup of countries and the literature on the economic consequences
of conﬂict and appropriation within countries. The paper has been inspired
by the work of Herschel Grossman and other scholars who have developed
formal models in which conﬂict and appropriation are economic activities
that require the diversion of resources from consumption and production.
In particular, we have studied the endogenous determination of secessions
when borders are the outcome of a contest between regions that have an
interest to maintain a union and regions that prefer to breakup the country
in order to choose types of government that are closer to their preferences. We
have analyzed the eﬀects of heterogeneity costs, economies of scale, external
threats, and conﬂict over domestic policies on the incentives to ﬁght for and
against secessions. Further extensions and analyses - including a general-
equilibrium study of the relationship between civil conﬂict, secessions, and
international conﬂict.- are left for further research
that are roughly equally split between two ethnic groups. On the theory and empirics of
ethnic conﬂict see Horowitz (1985), Collier (2001), and Caselli and Coleman (2006).
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